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SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
DAVID A. EUBANKS
Abstract. This paper addresses the theoretical conditions necessary for some
subject of study to survive forever. A probabilistic analysis leads to some
prerequisite conditions for preserving, say, electronic data indefinitely into the
future. The general analysis would also apply to a species, a civilization, or
any subject of study, as long as there is a definition of “survival” available. A
distinction emerges between two approaches to longevity: being many or being
smart. Natural selection relies on the first method, whereas a civilization,
individual, or other singular subject must rely on the latter. A computational
model of survival incorporates the idea of Kolmogorov-type complexity for
both strategies to illustrate the role of data analysis and information processing
that may be required. The survival-through-intelligence strategy has problems
when the subject can self-modify, which is illustrated with a link to Turing’s
Halting Problem. The paper concludes with comments on the Fermi Paradox.
1. Introduction
The idea of something lasting forever is an old one. In ancient times, the heavens
were eternal and immutable. Some today speculate that human immortality is just
around the technological corner [6]. In this paper we will reduce the question of
survival to probability and computation and see what this simple form can tell us
about the future of life, civilizations, or just your hard drive data.
The notion of survival is more general than simply biological survival. Whereas
we might informally say that our tax records survived a hard drive crash, we
wouldn’t seriously entertain the idea that the records were ever alive in the biolog-
ical sense. This generality is perhaps due to the utility of the notion of persistence
in a particular state of order or function. For our purposes here, some subject of in-
terest “survives” as long as it remains in some given state, corresponding loosely to
the way the word is commonly used. The only other condition is that non-survival
is permanent. For convenience, we will refer to the transition between survival and
non-survival as “death,” even though biological life may not be involved. As an
example: “The computer died, but the hard drive data survived.” Survival in this
context can be treated as a binary condition applying to virtually any subject of
interest. This could be an individual or species of some living thing, a machine, or
a more abstract subject like a business or civilization. In the latter realm it has
interesting applications to the future of the human race, or the search for other
intelligent life in the universe.
Some important related concepts are probabilities of survival, reproduction of
the subject, and the difference between the subject and its environment. In this con-
text, we will explore the probabilities of survival and derive strategies for a subject
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Problem.
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to survive indefinitely long with probability greater than zero. These strategies will
illuminate the importance of reproduction and the difficulties of surviving without
it. This topic is explored further by modeling a subject in a discrete environment
where computation is assumed to be necessary to survival in order to predict future
environmental states. This assumption allows the consideration of the computa-
tional complexity of an environment and survival subject.
We begin with the probabilities of forever.
2. Probabilities and Survival
In general, we may assume that survival is uncertain and treat this as a matter of
probabilities. Imagine that some subject survives each year (or other time period)
with a probability p. Assuming for a moment that p exists and is constant over
time, it’s easy to compute the dismal odds of long term survival as a decaying
exponential. Unless p = 1, the probability of n-year survival approaches zero. The
probability of surviving forever is exactly zero. But suppose one actually wanted to
survive indefinitely into the future with some non-zero probability despite annual
probabilities that are less than unity. Clearly, the annual probabilities must increase
over time.
2.1. Annual Survival Probabilities. We imagine some sequence of annual con-
ditional survival probabilities p1, p2,... for a subject of interest. That is, the con-
ditional probability that our subject, having survived for n years, will survive the
following year is given by pn+1. The cumulative probability of surviving that next
year would be the product of these, so we define
Pn =
n∏
j=1
pj
to be the probability of surviving n years with the given probabilities, and let
P = limn→∞ Pn. We will be interested in cases where P > 0. In this case we will
call the sequence p1, p2,... “survivable.”
A convenient form of pn for theoretical purposes is the double exponential p
bt−1 ,
where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of surviving the first year, and b ∈ [0, 1) is a
change coefficient. When time t = 1 we see that p1 = p
b0 = p as advertised. The
second year’s conditional chance of survival, assuming the first year was survived,
would be p2 = p
b1 , and so on. Thus
Pn = p
1+b+b2+...+bn
= p(1−b
n+1)/(1−b)
→ p1/(1−b) as n→∞
Let us define the “years at risk” y = 1/(1− b), which can be thought of as the
(finite) number of years of risk at probability p that would have to be endured to
equal the entire (infinite) number of years of risk with the constantly increasing
probability of survival controlled by b. For example, if b = .60, then the probability
of surviving forever is the same as surviving 2.5 years with a constant survival prob-
ability p. In this way we can create a class of survivable probability sequences and
demonstrate that there is no mathematical objection to surviving for indefinitely
long periods. If we wish, we can compare any survivable sequence for which we
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know P and P1 to the double exponential p
bt−1 by setting P = P y1 and compute
the years at risk y = lnP/ lnP1.
An example of a slowly growing survivable sequence is pn = exp(−cn
−1−ε),
where n = 1, 2, ... , and c > 0 is a scaling constant such that p1 = e
−c. We have
P =
∞∏
n=1
exp(−cn−1−ε)
= exp
(
−c
∞∑
n=1
n−1−ε
)
≤ exp
(
−c
∫ ∞
1
x−1−εdx
)
= exp(−c/ε)
= p
1/ε
1 .
Because the sum in the second line is finite, P > 0. The upper bound given is not
particularly tight, as one can check with ε = 1 so that P = exp(−cpi2/6) = p
pi2/6
1 ≈
p1.641 , whereas the given upper bound is p1. When ε becomes small, P also becomes
small, and the years at risk are bounded by y ≥ 1/ε. In this way we can construct
survivable sequences that have arbitrarily large years at risk.
In this section we have investigated some ways in which P > 0 can be achieved.
In all cases, there is no hope unless the annual probabilities p1, p2, .. increase toward
unity. We will next consider a practical strategy for increasing these probabilities
by making copies of the subject.
2.2. Survival through Redundancy. Suppose that our important data lives on
a hard drive or some other medium that has an annual probability of survival p.
After the first year, we copy the data onto another model of hard drive, also with
probability of survival p, and store it in an independent location. We continue
adding one hard drive per year ad infinitum. If any drive fails during the year, we
reconstruct it so that there are always n copies at the beginning of year n. Unless
all the hard drives fail in a given year, our data will live forever. For convenience,
let q = 1− p be the chance of failure of a drive. Assuming independence of failure
for the devices, we can compute the probability of survival as
Pn = (1 − q)(1− q
2)...(1− qn) and use a Bayesian expansion to obtain
= 1− q − q2(1− q)− q3(1− q)(1− q2)−
n−1∑
k=3
qk+1
{
(1− q)...(1 − qk)
}
≥ 1− q − q2(1− q)− q3(1− q)(1− q2)− (1 − q)(1− q2)(1− q3)
n−1∑
k=3
qk+1
= 1− q − q2(1− q)− q3(1− q)(1− q2)− q4(1− q2)(1 − q3)(1 − qn−4)
→ 1− q − q2(1− q)− q3(1− q)(1 − q2)− q4(1− q2)(1− q3) as n→∞.
This inequality gives good bounds when p is small. For example, when p = .5 we
can calculate numerically P = .289 versus a lower bound given by the inequality
of P ≥ .287. The years at risk for p = .5 can be found to be y = 1.79. These
calculations show that exponential growth in the number of copies is not required
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for survivability–a single extra copy per unit time suffices. However, probabilistic
independence is a strong assumption. If there is any constant probability ε that
the whole population will become extinct in a year (the chance of a giant comet
hitting the planet, for example), then Pn ≤ (1 − ε)
n still vanishes as n→∞. This
underscores the fact that independence cannot be a local condition for physical
life. To be successful, a program like the one described must eliminate all constant
probabilities of universal destruction, leaving only ones that continue to decline.
3. Two Strategies for Survival
As we saw in the previous section, one has to make relatively few independent
copies in order to have a positive probability of indefinite survival, but only if
survival of a copy can be considered to be general survival (unlike with an original
oil painting). In this case death doesn’t occur unless all copies are destroyed.
The probability of this destruction will be lowest if the individual probabilities
are uncorrelated. That is, the key to redundancy as a strategy is that the fates of
the copies are not correlated with one another. Having three backup copies of your
data is great. Having them all in the same location, not.
Life on Earth, driven by natural selection, has done a great job of colonizing every
nook and cranny of the planet, creating a very resilient system for perpetuating life.
It is apparent from these biological examples that a good strategy for increasing
survival probabilities of living things is the creation of many diverse copies. Let us
agree to call a strategy of replication with variation a Multiple Independent Copies
(MIC) approach. There are vast numbers of organisms on Earth (the “multiple
copies” part) with very diverse specializations (the “independent” part). Indepen-
dence can be achieved in different ways. Physical separation in space, differing
ways of gathering energy, and tolerance to different conditions, are some examples.
No living thing on Earth is truly independent of all others, of course, because we
all inhabit the same planet. Nevertheless, we will take biological evolution as the
conceptual model for a MIC.
In a MIC, survival of an individual is very much a secondary consideration to
multiplying and diversifying. It is natural to ask if it is possible for a single non-
reproducing entity to prolong its life indefinitely. Let us name this singular subject
a Single Intelligent System (SIS), which is intended to conjure an image of an in-
dividual organism or cohesive community that uses predictive abilities to increase
conditional survival chances. “Intelligent” refers solely to using information pro-
cessing to attempt to increase survival probabilities. This doesn’t mean exactly the
same thing that that word does in common usage. A very intelligent human can
nevertheless engage in an unhealthy lifestyle. With that caveat, we’ll use the term
without further disclaimers.
Lacking the massively parallel advantages of a MIC to discover and map local
environmental conditions, a SIS must do it through information processing. It
must collect information about the environment safely and inductively predict it
well enough to avoid death. Clearly, for the conditional survival probabilities to
approach one, the SIS must become better and better at predicting the environment;
it has to become smarter. In practice, a good way to predict the environment is to
learn how to control it, but we shall not distinguish this as a separate activity.
We will contrast the MIC and SIS strategies with an abstract model of survival.
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES 5
4. A Model for the Complexity of Survival
In this section we construct a simple computational model for a subject and its
environment. The cost for this simplification is that we assume that the processes
involved are computable in the sense of Church and Turing [3]. That is, the en-
vironment and the subject can be abstracted to a system of discrete symbols and
algorithmic operations on these.
Unless an environment is completely benign, it presents both opportunities and
obstacles to our subject’s survival. Taking the former and avoiding the latter must
be a primary function of any subject that seeks to improve its survival changes.
Our model will allow survival only for environments where patterns of opportunities
and threats can be found. These patterns can be of arbitrary complexity.
Studying the complexity of living organisms is common, but fraught with prob-
lems in defining what complexity actually is (see [1] and [10] for two recent example).
We will circumvent that by considering a purely theoretical model.
The complexity of patterns and rules can be defined in a useful way with the
notion of Kolmogorov Complexity, in which the complexity of a set of data is
the size of the smallest program that can reproduce it. For example, the digits
of pi = 3.1415... comprise an infinite sequence, but one that can be compactly
described with a relatively short algorithm for generating the digits. Therefore the
sequence of digits has finite complexity. The software and hardware implementation
details for this program are generally considered to be immaterial in the study of
Kolmogorov Complexity, and the reader is referred to [7] for more.
We will construct the following simple game, which will illuminate the relation-
ship between survival and environmental complexity. The two players in the game
are the subject whose survival we’re investigating and the local environment in
which it finds itself. The environment generates information that the subject can
experience in the manner described below. The subject may use this information
to take action or ignore it.
Definition 4.0.1. The Survival Game is played as follows. The environment de-
cides on one of three outputs: a zero, one, or blank. A zero indicates a non-
survivable environment for the subject. A one indicates a survivable condition that
would allow the subject another year (or other unit of time) of life. A blank, de-
noted with a dash “-” is a neutral environment that neither causes the death of the
subject nor aids in its longevity. The subject must independently (without knowl-
edge of the environment’s current play) decide on one of three actions, which are
symmetrical to the environment’s. It can choose to self-destruct by playing a zero,
ending its existence. It can instead play a one, which denotes engagement with the
environment. The results of this play are either to increment life span (in the case
that the environment = 1 that turn), cause death (in the case that the environment
= 0 that turn), or have no effect (in the case that the environment = “-” that turn).
Finally, the subject may simply “pass” and observe the environment by playing a
blank itself, in which case it neither increments lifespan nor dies. The subject can
pass as many times as it wishes and simply observe what the environment has de-
livered to it. The game proceeds by repeating this process until the subject dies.
The object of the game is for the subject to accumulate an unbounded lifespan.
The game rules are summarized in the table below, where E stands for environ-
ment, S for subject, and the result for the subject is noted in the table.
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E = 0 E = - E = 1
S = 0 Dies Dies Dies
S = - No Effect No Effect No Effect
S = 1 Dies No Effect Increments Lifespan
The elements of this game include:
• Information flows from environment to subject
• Information flows from a surviving subject to environment, with a possibil-
ity of changing it. That is, there is the possibility that the environment’s
output is a function of previous plays by the subject
• The end of the game with a finite score is compared to encountering a
non-survived condition (i.e. death)
• It’s possible for a subject to survive forever
• The complexity of the subject and environment can vary infinitely
For any finite number of plays we can consider the complexity of both players
using the Kolmogorov definition: complexity is the size of the smallest algorithmic
description. Let us take as an example modeling the survival complexity of a fire.
A fire’s response to any environmental condition is something like “burn, baby,
burn!” That is, it doesn’t pause and reflect about perhaps saving some fuel for later
or skipping that particular house out of humanitarian concerns. So as a player in the
survival game it has the lowest possible complexity: it always plays, which we can
denote {1111...}. The environment may or may not be hospitable to such a strategy.
In common experience, a fire burns as long is there are suitable conditions next to
it so that it can continue to spread. A typical environment then might be some
random string of ones and zeros. Let us suppose it’s {1110...}. It doesn’t matter
what happens after the zero because the fire will be dead, having had a lifespan of
three. In this case, the environment far exceeds the subject in complexity.
It is easy to see that a subject need not be as complex as its environment to
survive. As an example, take an environment that plays 1 on each even number
and each prime number, and 0 the rest of the time. We can imagine writing
an algorithm of fairly short length to generate this sequence by testing each odd
number for primeness. But a subject can survive the environment by simply playing
on the even numbers and passing on the odds.
It is necessary to survival that a subject anticipate and avoid all the zeros played
by the environment, but it need not participate each time the environment plays
one. In order to win the game it only needs to ensure that it can always accumulate
more lifespan, no matter how slowly. All that is required is that a survivable
subsequence of the environment exists, meaning that within this subsequence the
subject can predict the ones and zeros, and that there are an infinite number of ones
to be found. It’s not necessary for the subject to be as complex as its environment,
but it needs to be as complex as some survivable subsequence.
Real environments are not static conditions that can be mastered and forgotten.
There are vastly different conditions at different locations, and they vary with time
and with the actions of the subject. We can take this into account by imagining
a kind of approximation to the environmental sequence E in the following sense.
Suppose that a subject masters a local condition for a while, denoted by En. As
far as it knows, it has found out a survivable sequence. To give a specific example,
let’s let ek = 1 if k is odd, and ek = 0 otherwise. This is a low-complexity rule that
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is understood by our subject, which flourishes in it. But imagine that this apparent
rule was only an approximation to a more complex one, and that in actuality, when
k is an odd multiple of 999, the environment plays zero unexpectedly, violating the
conclusion of the subject’s simple rule. How can the subject negotiate this increase
in complexity? We will examine that question separately from the point of view of
a MIC and a SIS.
From a MIC’s perspective, it’s good to have lots of copies doing different things.
So it’s easy to imagine that there are varieties of the subject that do not play on
every single odd-numbered turn, but rather pass on some opportunities. In the
scenario described above, only those specimens that pass on turn 999 will survive.
The survivors will thrive and multiply until the next die-off at turn 2997. As long
as the main pattern survives with these few exceptions, and the MIC continues to
make diverse copies, it can survive the higher complexity environment. The MIC as
a whole has greater complexity than the simple base rule of playing each odd turn,
because it can account for many different contingencies even though individuals
within the MIC may have relatively low complexity.
A MIC can diversify into different local environments and develop corresponding
survival strategies through trial and error, as long as it has some ability to reproduce
with variation as in biological evolution. This diversification increases the total
complexity of the MIC as time goes on by virtue of the fact that it increases the
number of different survivable environments. This is perhaps the simplest form
of inductive reasoning: create many hypotheses and cross off the ones that don’t
fit the data, leaving only candidates that seem to work. A MIC is in that sense
an inductive machine for finding deductive environmental rules. As long as the
environment cooperates by not changing its rules too quickly, the MIC may be able
to increase in complexity indefinitely.
The author has developed a simple artificial life simulation of the survival game
defined above. It allows a user to define and change an environment, and allows a
MIC of simple algorithms to evolve to survive it. For more information see [4].
We now turn our attention to the SIS approach to survival. A SIS does not
have the option of making copies of itself. It can only survive by accumulating
environmental ones while completely avoiding the zeros.
It is clear that a SIS needs to be cautious about participating in the environment
(playing a one itself) in order to avoid an unexpected zero and death. It must rely
completely on its inductively produced prediction of environmental rules to do this.
If the environment is significantly more complex than the SIS anticipates, the SIS
will miss critical contingencies and die. Imagine that we’ve been quietly observing
the universe as it produces a subsequence {101010...1010} alternating ones and
zeros like clockwork for some number of turns. We are reasonably confident that
we can play a one safely on the next turn of the subsequence, but we can’t be
certain. This is the nature of inductive reasoning, as Karl Popper argued [8].
In the example, the {101010...} subsequence may eventually turn into something
else, perhaps non-survivable. The only way to understand that it may end must
come from outside the sequence itself. The SIS must find some more general induc-
tive rule that explains more of the environment. A rule that says “day and night
alternate after several hours” cannot take into account solar eclipses. So in order to
survive, the SIS has to continually look beyond its own current survivable sequences
and find patterns in other environmental data that allow broader inductive rules
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to be formed; it has to continually become more complex. Unlike a MIC’s shotgun
approach, the SIS has to do this through limited experimentation and development
of theory.
A SIS would necessarily spend much of its time observing, experimenting, and
formulating hypotheses in order to better refine its inductive rules (doing science,
in other words). The success of this strategy depends on probabilities for survival
increasing fast enough to meet the demands outline in the first section of the paper.
Success depends on “smoothness” of the environment, or in other words, how good
induction is at predicting near-term events.
We conclude this section with some optimism that both MIC and SIS are viable
strategies for long-term survival, but that MIC is more robust. The SIS must devote
most of its energy toward observation, experimentation, prediction, and careful
interaction with the environment. In the next section we will consider another
challenge to long-term SIS survival.
5. The Problem of Self-Prediction
Any SIS would do well to control its environment in order to increase predictabil-
ity. A critical observation is the following: any SIS subject is part of its own en-
vironment; it is not immune from creating life-threatening situations without any
help from the uncaring universe. If it must work to reduce environmental com-
plexity to be within its own understanding, this also applies to its own complexity.
That is, it needs to be able to model its own behavior just as much as it needs to be
able to model the behavior of external conditions. But this represents something of
a paradox. Any SIS is exactly as complex as itself. In order to predict what it will
do in the future, it actually needs to be more complex than itself. Understanding
this challenge is the subject of this section.
We can probably safely assume that a SIS must be able to modify its physical
parts and logical functions in order to survive indefinitely. Time and entropy will
guarantee that physical parts will have to eventually be replaced. Because its
intelligence is housed in things made of matter and energy, this means that it can
potentially modify everything about itself, both physical and virtual.
As a thought experiment, let’s imagine a well-integrated system–I’ll call it an
intelligent robot. In practice, this robot could be a proxy for any intelligent being,
a whole civilization, or race of creatures integrated into a monolithic organization.
This robot is good at rationally perceiving its environment and protecting itself
from present and future external threats. But a perfectly rational being may have
no particular reason for preferring existence to non-existence. In fact, a perfectly
logical being may have no reason to do anything. Consider what we might call the
Decider’s Paradox. Our perfectly logical robot is presented with some environmen-
tal data. What is its first question? It could logically be “What should my first
question be?” Similarly, its second question could logically be “What should my
second question be?” No other types of questions are possible without an illogical
answer to the first one. Obviously some other kind of logic is desirable–something
that resembles an emotional state that would allow courses of action to be priori-
tized.
In order for our robot to survive, it must want to, in the sense that when it
perceives threats it does not simply ignore them. Rather, it must make complicated
assessments about what trade-offs are necessary for long-term survival, such as
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present sacrifice to preserve the ability to act later. Or it might have to decide which
of its appendages to sacrifice in the present so that it may continue to function in
the future. At first blush, this seems simple enough: we’ll just design our robot
with this imperative so deeply placed into its programming that it gives survival
precedence over all other things. This seems to work fine in biological organisms,
which generally have a strong aversion to self death. But for our purposes it is
insufficient. Because the robot is intelligent, it is smart enough to reverse its own
engineering and perceive this trick we’ve played upon it. What is to stop it from
replacing that bit of programming with something else? In fact, that may well be
necessary.
Consider our own “programming” as human beings. We’re the product of billions
of years of creatures that survived long enough to reproduce, and therefore have very
deep survival instincts. And yet we can fall asleep while driving a car. Obviously
our programming didn’t foresee that possibility. If we could re-engineer that bit of
our brains, we could tweak the part that seems to say “if not much is happening,
it’s okay to sleep” and put some more sophisticated code in there. Of course we can
hack our own programming by drinking lots of coffee, opening the windows, and
tuning to a talk radio station, but this is crude compared to real self-modification.
Even if we could modify our cranial code to keep us alert while driving, it’s very
likely that we will not anticipate all conditions under which we want to remain alert
(or sleep). It may be essential that we be able to self-modify in this way in order
to meet future environmental conditions. But if we can do so, what is to stop us
from permanently turning off the pain or hunger switch?
In terms our our survival game, let’s suppose our sensible SIS has a Rule Zero
that reads “never play zero,” since playing zero means death. But because it can
modify its own rules, it must also check for conditions under which it might change
or eliminate Rule Zero. How might it do this? It would need to simulate all
environmental conditions to ensure that no conditions led it to become suicidal.
But this entails also tracking any changes in its own rules that might spring from
environmental changes. That is, a rule change that resulted from energy becoming
more scarce could have unexpected effects later on, so this variant SIS would need
to be simulated. But that variation would itself spark further variations, and so
on. Without a complete understanding of what all possible rules changes and
subsequent rules changes might have, it is likely impossible to guarantee that the
SIS wouldn’t unexpectedly drop the Rule Zero.
If the SIS makes its decisions according to some algorithm, the situation is an
example of a “halting problem,” posed by Alan Turing [11]. The problem has no
general solution in that there is no one algorithm that can be applied to determine
whether our robot will suicide or not. That bears repeating: there is no determin-
istic method possible for determining whether or not general self-modifying robots
are ultimately suicidal. Actually, the situation is even worse. A generalization
called Rice’s Theorem guarantees that only trivial properties of such computations
can be known in general [9].
We might wonder how probable this suicidal halting event is. Surprisingly, that
question has been considered by mathematicians in another form. Gregory Chaitin
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constructs a real number Ω that is a kind of average halting probability for algo-
rithms, where the informal definition is
(5.0.1) Ω =
∑
p halts
2|−p|.
The sum is over all programs that halt, which are expressed in some given com-
puter language and considered binary strings for purposes of computing the sum
[2]. His conclusion is that this number cannot be computed, nor even usefully esti-
mated. It inhabits a region of the real numbers that is off limits to any algorithmic
form of investigation, including conclusions based on axiomatic systems. The the-
oretical interest in this number is just this property–its pathological intractability.
The Ω probability applies to a SIS only if its intelligence derives from computable
behavior, a prerequisite assumption for the survival game described in the previous
section.
We should therefore apply the survival probability factor (1 − Ω) to the chain
of probabilities that any SIS must endure. We cannot know what the number is,
however, so we might resign ourselves to this “complexity tax” on the probability
of survival of any SIS. The value of Ω will not prevent an arbitrarily long-lived SIS
from existing, but it does lower the probability to some unknown upper bound. If
this upper bound is low enough, we should not expect to see a long-lived SIS in
our galactic neighborhood, nor should we realistically hope that we will create one
with our human endeavors.
Rice’s Theorem is a general one that does not rule out the possibility of predicting
what a particular algorithm will do. There is an ongoing project, for example, to
create practical tools for particular types of software projects to ensure that the
programs don’t hang unexpectedly. Byron Cook, the project leader, is quoted
saying:
Turing proved that, in general, proving program termination is un-
decidable. However, this result does not preclude the existence of
future program-termination proof tools that work 99.9 percent of
the time on programs written by humans. This is the sort of tool
that were aiming to make. [5]
A SIS should be heavily involved in such research activities in order to minimize
the probability of self-destruction. In addition to theoretical and experimental
explorations of the environment, it must pursue similar strategies to understand its
own behavior and become better at predicting it.
6. Conclusions
We have introduced the idea of analyzing the idea of indefinitely long survival
with simple tools from mathematics and computer science. Mathematically, the
success of such a project depends on increasing conditional probabilities at a suf-
ficient rate. We have see that this is feasible using multiple independent copies
(MIC) if we are allowed to consider the survival of any one copy a success. It
is more challenging for a single intelligent system (SIS), which must continually
improve its probabilities by developing a better understanding of its environment.
These differences are usefully illustrated using a computational model for the in-
teractions between a subject and its environment. An additional problem for a SIS
is that of self-prediction in order to avoid self-destruction.
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The barriers for a SIS to survive long-term are substantial. One might say that
complacency is the kiss of death, since continually increasing conditional probabili-
ties is a requirement. Given the connection to the Halting Problem, we should also
conclude that careful scrutiny of the ways a SIS can self-modify must be more than
a passing concern. Because of the comparative advantages of a MIC, we should not
be surprised to notice that the patterns of the enduring structures of the world,
both living and inert, are many and diverse rather than singular and intelligent.
These considerations lead naturally to the conclusion that if a civilization is
to survive for a long time, it must become continually concerned with threats to
overall survival, including internal ones. The search for similar civilizations in the
wider universe should be tempered with the likelihood that a true SIS is likely to
be rare, especially in comparison to MIC-like systems. This speaks to the Fermi
Paradox, which asks why the galaxy isn’t crawling with intelligent life. A weaker
form wonders why there isn’t at least evidence of self-replicating “von Neumann”
probes, which could presumably spread throughout the galaxy in a few million
years.
If it requires a SIS for the design of such probes, and there is a very low prob-
ability that a SIS will live long enough to develop this technology, then such a
galactic swarm is less likely. Additionally, any SIS that persists long enough to
develop such technology will be able to evaluate the merits of such a plan in terms
of usefulness to its own survival, and may decide that it is not in its own interests
to unleash such creatures on other solar systems. This decision hinges on an in-
teresting design problem: how adaptable should a von Neumann probe be? Since
they would have to construct copies of themselves out of raw materials they find,
they would in principle have the means to completely alter their own construction.
Any errors in this process could lead to an ecology that would evolve and grow like
a MIC, and this may happen before they develop the ability to colonize yet another
star. Worse, they could come back and compete with the originating SIS. On the
other hand, if the tendency for mutation is somehow engineered out of them, they
will not be adaptable to unexpected conditions. It may simply be that there is no
‘sweet spot’ between these two alternatives that allows for a suitable interstellar
propagation of such probes. Therefore, there may be a low probability that a SIS
will create such a probe to begin with, and when they are created it may be that
they evolve into local ecologies so quickly that no exponential growth of colonized
systems materializes.
As a more prosaic example, the conclusions of this paper could lead one to believe
that a democratic government cannot focus solely on external threats, but should
also be constantly trying to improve the chances that it does not “self-destruct”
into tyranny.
As a final practical note, we might take away from this discussion the notion
that if we want to increase our chances of not having an automobile accident then
we should strive to be a bit more careful (or drive less) each day . More generally,
if we want the things we care about in our lives to endure, we should take a similar
approach to constant improvement. Probably nothing really does last forever, but
finite need not mean small.
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